The article analyzes the changing approach to state formation in the stories of Joshua, Saul, David and Solomon. I scrutinized these stories for features of emerging constitutional and institutional economic governance.
Introduction
The paper develops the key thesis that the early history of modern economic theory of state formation emerged in the Hebrew Bible: The Hebrew Bible anticipated contemporary, 'modern' political and institutional economic theory of how agents initially escape out of anarchy and violence, the 'Hobbesian war', and of how society prevents a relapse into this sour state.
My economic reconstruction is textual in nature, treating the Hebrew Bible as 'prose fiction.' I am neither interested in questions of redactional analysis such as which writers compiled the Bible, nor am I interested in questions of actual historical fact which ask if the Hebrew Bible could be regarded as a depiction of 'real' events in space-time. Instead, I followed a 'narrative approach', which has made considerable inroads even into biblical analysis. 2 The implied textual understanding of the Hebrew 6 these texts serve to explain changes to governance. As my analysis grew more detailed further institutional and constitutional economic concepts were defined.
Defining the nature of the state and state formation.
The purpose of this section is not to provide any definite answers as to what a state is or to what state formation amounts to. Rather, I would like to arrive at some kind of 'definitional conclusions', if this is feasible at all, as a result of my analysis.
Weber revamped a definition of the state by focusing on the means a modern state uses but not its ends. 10 His analysis of the state commenced with the insight that a situation of violence precedes the formation of a 'state.' Otherwise, he could not have discussed questions of legitimate, monopolized use of force and violence by a state.
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For the purposes of the present paper, Weber's key concepts need to be economically 'enhanced', especially regarding the meaning of 'community', and 'state using legitimate force and violence', also by an 'initial situation of anarchy' that is to be overcome through state formation, and by the idea of 'state organization' or 'government.'
In contrast to Weber, Buchanan's constitutional economics explicitly conceptualized a process showing how an initial, anarchic state of nature, in which no social order existed and total war (i.e. the war of all) quite literally reigned, could be overturned by 10 prevent all-controlling leviathans and other oppression through rulers, including those who oppress in the name of God. 16 Wallis and North's understanding of the 'state' as the community that negotiates ('organizes') ways out of anarchy through the setting up of state structures and enforcement agencies 17 , points in a similar direction, as does Auster and Silver's understanding of this aspect of the state as a 'firm' that specializes in both 'protective' and 'punitive services.' 18 Although the protective state limits individual liberties through rules, essentially it is these rules that guarantee individual freedom -within their agreed parameters of course. Through the protective state, legal rights (in property and in property exchange) are secured for all members of the community for an 'indefinite future.' 19 Even so, Buchanan stresses that readjustments in constitutional contract may become inevitable over time, in order to prevent a relapse into anarchy -should distances between rulers and subjects widen over time. 18 Auster and Silver, State as Firm, pp. 17, 20. 19 Mancur Olson, 'Dictatorship, Democracy, and Development,' American Political Science Review 87 (1993), p. 572; although Olson does not explicitly distinguish between protective state and productive state, this distinction is implicitly visible when he differentiates different reasons for members of a community for accepting rulers: having stable legal rights, on the one hand, and productivity gains through being taxed, on the other. A similar comment applies for Auster and Silver, State as Firm, especially regarding how they set up chapter 2 of their study.
Protective state structures necessitate a referee or 'judge' enforcing laws through economic sanctioning mechanisms, but the protective state does not cover the process through which a community collectively chooses or further legislates itself regarding 'public goods' and the spending of taxation. The latter relates, as Buchanan reminds us, to the productive state, which tends to be the traditional domain of economic analysis as, for instance, acknowledged by Auster and Silver. 21 However, the creation of rules for taxation, how and why taxes can be lowered or raised by the productive state, are decided by the collective in the initial constitutional contract as 'part of' the protective state. problems and transaction cost inefficiencies existed regarding common tasks (for 'public goods' and how to collect taxes for their provision). The existing governance structures invited 'anarchy' and self-interested maneuvering among the Israelite tribes. The kinds of property or 'goods x' that had been safeguarded through the 'twelve-tribe league' (the way land was split and land governance happened through the assembly) were something like 'tribal independence', 'tribal democracy' and 'tribal security', loosely adjudicated by the assembly, but not 'national security', 'national democracy' and 'national independence.' 'Good x' can here, for instance, be further specified as tribal manpower that has to be allocated to shared defense tasks, as in the formation of a standing army.
These 'national' goods were under threat continually from warring adjacent nations and those nations whom the Israelites had evicted from the Promised Land. Civil war amongst the Israelites was another possibility, especially since national security national democracy and national independence had not been secured. Clearly, the tribes had a common interest to cooperate regarding the shared provision of the defense of territory or the maintaining of democracy, since this allowed not only Israel as a collective group but also individual tribes to reduce costs for setting up institutional structures to provide these goods. However, for these two goods (i.e. national defense; maintaining of independence) conflicting interests already existed.
For example, from the point of view of individual tribes, it made good economic sense to opt out, on grounds of self-interest, from defense tasks once it became apparent that the attack of an external or internal aggressor was not aimed at their own territory. Regarding 'national independence', problems of self-interested maneuvering could be expected to be even more divisive.
Buchanan predicted in this respect that ultimately the potential for cost savings would induce interacting parties, in this instance the Israelite tribes, to change their institutional structures. I will discuss this below when institutional structures under Saul's, David's and Solomon's reign are analyzed.
As much as internally a condition of anarchy and civil war was reduced under Joshua, at the inter-national level, no cooperation was established. No economic gains from cooperation or disarmament were realized other than one minor exception as described in Chapter 9 of Joshua: God had directed the Israelites not to make peace treaties with nations that occupied the Promised Land but to evict them -and this instruction, which still reflected the 'spirit' of Moses (e.g. renewed in Joshua 23: 7, 12, 24: 19-20), largely explains the antagonistic stance of the Israelites against other nations. However, the Gibeonites achieved, by means of deception, to hold on to their territory in the Promised Land. Since Joshua (or more precisely: the elders of Joshua's assembly) had agreed to a peace treaty with the Gibeonites by an oath to God, they were stuck with this institutional arrangement. As a result, a cooperative and mutually beneficial agreement, resulting in economic gains for both parties, was set up between the Gibeonites and the Israelites.
State Formation under Saul: Emerging Kingship and Defense Integration
As noted, under Joshua, the problems surrounding 'goods x' national defense, national independence and national democracy had remained. The only coordination mechanism for common defense tasks that could possibly be said to have existed under Joshua was the assembly. Calling upon the assembly, however, was a rather time consuming, costly endeavor and it still invited strategic maneuvering among the Israelite tribes regarding as to who would cooperate with whom when it came to defense tasks. The idea of the community reflected a collection of twelve loosely connected independent groups, who put their own interests first. Only if all the tribes were targeted by one aggressor, could cooperation be expected to materialize regarding the common sharing of defense tasks, but even this was rather costly while being time consuming and complicated to organize because independent armies had to be merged into one.
Regarding the maintaining of democracy, problems of institutional governance showed similar features as compared to the defense problem. The problem regarding the maintaining of independence, however, was more acute since it cut at the very heart of basic rights for maintaining tribal identity versus national identity. Clearly some major conflicting interests could be expected, despite the common history of the tribes and the manifestation of a shared religion in the course of the exodus journey.
Buchanan speaks in this connection of an 'adjudication role of the collectivity.'
46 By this he meant that conflicts needed to be settled through an agreement process which involved all warring factions but is not settled top-down, authoritatively and without legitimation by any possibly existing state structures. For the circumstances described in the Hebrew Bible at this point, a state structure did not exist that could legitimately (in a Lockean sense) swiftly settle conflicts. As discussed, Joshua had introduced the assembly, which was a very loose, highly 'federalist' government structure. Second, Saul had to draw on metaphysical support to make the Israelites cooperate and transfer tribal defense responsibilities to Saul. God's involvement reflects a premodern approach to institutional governance, relying on the 'shivering human being' before God, as Buchanan critically branded this approach 51 , and it also compares to a spiritually claimed but earthly and often economically motivated role of the Church in medieval government organization, as economic historians have outlined. ; second, by identifying economic growth, rising 61 I question in this connection that 'All that Solomon does economically is done "in wisdom"' (Jobling, 'Forced Labor', p. 66). At least, I would try to economically conceptualize this process, through institutional economics, and claim that such rationalisation (which Jobling, 'Forced Labor', p. 66, may critically even call the 'commodification of wisdom', a term used by him, albeit in a different context) is enlightening and indeed 'ideal' (in Jobling's sense, 'Forced Labor', p. 66): yielding prosperity for all (mutual gains). This conceptual strategy generates in my view a more convincing argument regarding 'ideal', societal benefits of the 'commodification of wisdom', which Jobling contests for Solomon's economic success (the success being only 'non-ideal', 'real' in Jobling's terms, reflecting forced labor and labor alienation, as in a Marxist critical reading). 62 North and Weingast, 'Constitutions and Commitment,' p. 803. 63 North and Weingast, 'Constitutions and Commitment,' p. 804. 64 North and Weingast, 'Constitutions and Commitment,' p. 831. wealth ('mutual gains') and political freedom in the Solomon story, which North and Weingast or Buchanan view as an outcome of successful, modern institutional and constitutional economic reform 65 ; and third, by addressing the fundamental issue of whether property rights were indeed economically secured through institutional reform, rather than through having a wise ruler who consistently resisted -through 'responsible behavior' -to renege on property rights promises made to subjects. In order to explain in economic terms why the people accepted Solomon as ruler, they must have gained more than they lost through Solomon's policies. Savings in attack and defense costs regarding the resolution of anarchy (civil war; attack by external forces), as advocated by Buchanan, are one key consideration. Other reasons relate to rising prosperity that is generated through private market exchange in a society that is well protected from internal and external raiders. 68 Olson critically reviews this as 'banditry' at the top of a state: through taxation. However, such 'state banditry' benefits the people, the ruler protecting the people from 'other' bandits, for instance, through an army. 69 North and Weingast develop in this connection the related argument that transaction costs are lowered for private market exchanges (by a ruler self-binding himself/herself, as reviewed further below). The resulting increases in wealth (realized through more efficient private market exchanges)
Specialization and division of labor
together with cost savings on predation and attack, must more than compensate the taxation costs and other costs imposed by the ruler.
Solomon's policies seemed to ensure that the Israelites benefited more than they lost . 71 Jobling, 'Forced Labor', pp. 61-62. 72 Boer, 'Western Marxism', p. 9; Charusheela, 'Response', p. 323.
debts.' 73 In my view, the system was openly 'capitalist' yet democratic and pluralistic (see also below).
Contrary to the historically rationalized expectation of Auster and Silver for ancient kings, it was not the case at this point that '…authority [to rule] flowed from the worship of the sacred fire.' 74 It was economic welfare in society that legitimized the kingship instead of religion in a spiritual, supernatural sense. Religious artifacts, like
Solomon's temple, were an expression of wealth.
Under Solomon, a rise in wealth went hand in hand with a rise in freedom. Pluralism was mastered as an interaction condition: Solomon was married to an Egyptian; he built temples for the foreign gods of his many foreign wives and Solomon even worshipped these foreign gods (1 Kings 11: 1-2, 4-7). Bureaucratic stratification of religious leadership is implied: A 'pluralistic framework of late pre-exilic Judah' emerged, as Mayes commented in historic economic perspective 75 , and which many theologians and biblical scholars have branded as folly and sinful. 76 Personal belief systems, including religious belief, are in such a pluralistic society subordinated to the private level and the economic sphere dominates this kind of society. 77 What
North and Weingast might call 'political freedom' 78 and what they identified as a key feature of successful institutional economic reform -in a modern society -emerged at this point in the stories.
Institutional reform, decentralization and the securing of property rights
Was the rise in wealth and freedom / pluralism due to effective economic guarantees of property rights, or do we have to fall back exclusively on interpretations that favor Solomon's wise leadership, he consistently exhibiting 'responsible behavior'? The economic guarantee of property rights can be identified in various ways. rather than centralization and class exploitation as a feature of the Solomon stories. 81 The hierarchical guarantee of property rights led to the fostering of capitalist, nontributary modes of production (at the 'productive state' level) and I strongly contest Gottwald's hypothesis in this regard. Property rights were considerably strengthened through international institutional reform. 86 Property rights were at least much more secure than in preceding stories when (internal and external) wars reigned. Such security in property rights lowers transaction costs for private market exchange, and subsequently contributes to economic growth and rising prosperity for a society (See above also).
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In conclusion, and to underline the point that we are dealing with a free society, Solomon remained answerable to the 'people', as a legitimating source of the kingship and of a societal contract between king and people. The quasi- Conceptual roots of a theory of state formation relate under Joshua to the land distribution problem and how comparatively democratic state governance mechanisms (the assembly) were introduced. The approach was probably too federalist, since integrative mechanisms required for common tasks such as the defense of land or the maintaining of democracy had not been set up. Under Saul this problem was gradually resolved, the Israelites being merged into a unified army. 93 Buchanan, Limits of Liberty, pp. 11-24, 288.
The vision of an organizing community was thereby extended from a representative decision-making forum (the assembly) to a pool that offered resources ('human capital') for common tasks, such as defense.
That the condition of anarchy is always 'present' in society, as Buchanan stresses
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, and that it's resolution was only temporary is demonstrated by the events after Solomon's death, with existing cooperation generating policies being given up and Israel rapidly disintegrating. A meta-theoretical implication here is that the text is rather modern, therefore questioning, for instance, Gottwald Therefore, the David stories and even more so the Solomon stories addressed the institutional problem of establishing a settled society from a different perspective. The focus of societal contracting shifted away from the protective state (and its focus on 94 Anderson, 'Greek State', p. 4, understates this point by looking at modern states which show little signs of coercion or anarchy (because, so I would argue, they have established a functioning protective state). However, once the protective state is undermined in modern states, for whatever reason, a rise in anarchy and a consequent rise in coercive state measures or the renegotiation of constitutional contract can be expected. Jobling is more critical in this respect and much closer to Buchanan, although Jobling analyses from a critical Marxist perspective (Jobling, 'Forced Labor', p. 58). 95 Gottwald, Hebrew Bible, p. 345-346. resolving anarchy and lowering attack/defense costs) to the productive state (and its focus on wealth creation and lowering transaction costs for private market exchanges). Savings in transaction costs in private market exchanges could be seen most explicitly in the Solomon stories, with property rights being guaranteed by constraining rulers in different respects (e.g. through bureaucratic hierarchy, alliances, trade contracts, etc.), in both national and international perspective. Then, the economics of division of labor and of trade in private goods came into full bloom.
In this regard, the Hebrew Bible anticipated, at least to some degree, Adam Smith's writings on how the division of labor and the institutionally secured liberalization of trade within a nation and among nations would benefit all parties involved and lead to 'wealth for all' (i.e. 'mutual gains', 'wealth of nations'). As a by-product of the political and economic international opening up of the Israelite society under Solomon, pluralism arose. This was in sharp contrast to earlier 96 The only comparable examples that we find in this respect in the Hebrew Bible are the Joseph stories. A hero-thesis and a climax-thesis can be attributed to these two stories (Wagner-Tsukamoto, God an Economist). Future research can deepen these insights through a comparative analysis of the Joseph stories and the Solomon stories. periods. 98 Solomon actively supported this development. Ultimately, he is even described as having worshipped many different gods. Some interpreters have reviewed this very critically. In contrast to this, an institutional economic reconstruction attests to the existence at this point in the stories of a democratically governed, pluralistic and free society. This value diverse society became feasibleeven necessary -because of the institutional economic changes pioneered by Solomon.
Finally, it is important to remember that at all points during the reigns of Joshua, Saul, David and Solomon, leaders remained answerable to society, to the 'people' as the Hebrew Bible generally put it, or the 'elders' and other members of the assembly, as they were singled out. This implies a democratic model of a constitutional contract between the people and its leadership, ultimately the monarch (in the stories that involve Saul, David and Solomon).
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In line with this governance issue and the remarks made on the mastering of anarchy, the emergence of governmental hierarchy, the negotiation of international trade treaties, and the development of a pluralistic free society, we can tracegrounded in a non-positivist, interpretative, 'textual' epistemology -the early beginnings of an economic theory of state formation in the Hebrew Bible. A metatheoretical implication is the view expressed herein that, contrary to the skepticism of modern writers on the state and society, and on the emergence of a debate on state 98 Mayes, 'Deuteronomistic Ideology', p. 79. 99 Rudiments of a two-party, rivalry system for ruler succession are present, as they characterize many modern democracies (see also Auster and Silver, State as Firm, p. 70; Olson, 'Dictatorship').This is visible, for instance, when Saul and David battle for the kingship; when David is challenged by family members; or when Solomon's sons split ruling functions. For the internal ruling of the Israelites, apparently no simple, straight line of succession existed in these stories.
formation (including economically inspired ones 100 ), the Hebrew Bible reveals a critical and modern -institutionally economic grounded -approach to questions of how the state is ruled and whether this is tolerated by 'society', the people, as an economically legitimizing force.
The ease with which textual events of the claimed archaic, and supposedly premodern documents comprising the 'Hebrew Bible' can be reconstructed through contemporary, 'modern' institutional economics raises fundamental questions regarding the early history of institutional economic theory formation. We have to reevaluate our understanding of 'modernity' (especially in relation to 'antiquity'), 'economic progress in modern times', and the claimed emergence of enlightenment concepts by Buchanan 103 On grounds of the analysis undertaken in this paper, this can even be further extended in a fundamental, historic perspective by critically asking in which society and for which society the Hebrew Bible was written. The suggestion that we can understand the Hebrew Bible as an early, modern predecessor of Smithsonian political economics can here be supported on at
